Some Problems Concerning Expert Witnesses by Meyer, Bernard S.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 42 
Number 3 Volume 42, January 1968, Number 3 Article 1 
April 2013 
Some Problems Concerning Expert Witnesses 
Bernard S. Meyer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Meyer, Bernard S. (1968) "Some Problems Concerning Expert Witnesses," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 42 : 
No. 3 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol42/iss3/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
VOLUME XLII JANUARY 1968 NUMBER 3
SOME PROBLEMS CONCERNING
EXPERT WITNESSES t
BERNARD S. MEYER *
T HIS discussion concerns (1) to what extent discovery
may be had concerning the adversary's expert and
his report and when the deposition of such an expert may
be taken, and (2) when a party may use the opposing
party's expert or the opposing party himself as an expert
at the trial. By engaging in this discussion, I pose as an
expert on experts. I, therefore, thought I had best first
ascertain what an expert is. I found many and varying
definitions, some familiar, others not. Thus, we all recall
Nicholas Murray Butler's definition (though we may not
be expert enough to recall that he was the one who said it)
of an expert as a man who knows more and more about
less and less. Less familiar perhaps is Mr. Dooley's descrip-
tion of the war expert as "a man ye niver heerd iv befure.
If ye can think iv annywan whose face is onfamilyar to ye
an' ye don't raymimber his name, an' he's got a job on
a pa-aper ye didn't know was published, he's a war
expert."
But, I digress. Turning to discovery and deposition,
I note first that this area is another illustration of the
resistance of bench and bar to procedural change. As we
tAn address delivered before the National Conference of State Trialjudges on August 1, 1967.
* Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Nassau
County.
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examine the reasons that have been given for not allowing
discovery or deposition, you will see that most of them
have little substance. Moreover, strong arguments can be
made for a liberal discovery and deposition policy, subject
to protective supervision by the court. Nonetheless, there
is little evidence of liberality aside from the practice that
has developed in some federal circuits, and Maryland's
Rule of Procedure 410(c) (2) which provides for discovery
of:
a written report of an expert, whom the opposing party proposes
to call as a witness, whether or not such report was obtained by
the opposing party in anticipation of trial or in preparation for
litigation. If such expert has not made a written report to the
opposing party, such expert may be examined upon written ques-
tions or by oral deposition as to his findings and opinion.
What are the advantages of a liberal policy? First,
I suppose I should define what I mean by a liberal policy.
Such a policy would provide that except for good cause
shown no party may call an expert witness unless his
adversary has been notified a specified time (not less than
thirty days) in advance of trial of the name and address
of the expert to be called and has received a statement of
the expert's qualifications and a copy of his report. It
would further provide that with the permission and subject
to the conditions fixed by the court, the deposition of an
opponent's expert could be taken. Subject to further
study concerning the problems that might be created by
so providing, it might permit a party to take the deposition
of his own expert. Such a deposition could then be used
at the trial in lieu of the witness, against any party who
had notice of the deposition and an opportunity to cross-
examine; but, to provide sufficient time for preparation of
cross-examination, the rule should state that at the option
of any opposing party, cross-examination could be deferred
for a period not exceeding thirty days.
Probably the most startling part of that proposal is
the provision that a party may take the deposition of his
own expert witness. Yet, I am informed that Virginia
has a rule so permitting, and that in the Ninth Federal
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Circuit such a system has been used and has worked well.
It appears to have a number of very real advantages.
All of us are aware of the problems involved in getting
expert witnesses into court. The fees charged by experts,
at least in metropolitan areas, have made trial of even
the run of the mill negligence action, involving injuries
of any complexity, difficult for all but the richest litigants,
and the increase in fees can be charged in good part to
the time required of the expert in traveling to and from
the trial, awaiting the call to the stand, and responding
to examination and cross-examination. I have tried one
case involving a claim of traumatic cancer in which the
experts on either side were the heads of the appropriate
departments in two of New York's leading hospitals. Each
was to receive 500 for his court appearance, but neither
could accommodate his schedule to the courts. We finally
ended up with a stipulation, believe it or not, that I
would read to the jury the qualifications of each expert
and the hypothetical question and would inform the jury
that the plaintiff's expert would answer the question "yes"
and the defendant's "no." The parties saved $1,000 in fees
and a mistrial was avoided, but how the jury could have
made an intelligent selection between the two I do not
know. They brought in a verdict for the defendant, so I
had no opportunity to find out.
Had the proposed rule been in effect, the problem
could have been avoided. The doctors' schedules would
have been accommodated by bringing the court reporter
to them, and most likely the fees would have been less.
I say most likely because, though the rule necessarily
contemplates a two-stage deposition in order to give the
opposing party time to consult his own expert before pro-
ceeding with cross-examination, the probability is that the
deposition of the experts on both sides would be taken
and in such a case examination and cross-examination of
both would probably proceed at the same session.
I can envisage at least two problems that may reduce
the practicability of the proposal. The first is that the
jurors do not see the witness. When we finally graduate
1968]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
to video-tape that problem will disappear. Until then,
when a party has an expert who projects, as they say,
who is a smooth, persuasive talker, he will want the expert
personally present in the courtroom. The second is that
the trial proof of foundation facts may fail. In such an
event it may be necessary to call the expert at the trial
notwithstanding his deposition, and that involves a possible
continuance or mistrial, added expense and possible em-
barrassment to the expert on his trial cross-examination
because of opinions expressed in his deposition. Some
types of cases will lend themselves more readily to this
technique than others. Further study along these lines,
and inquiry into the experience in Virginia and in the
Ninth Circuit is surely advisable before a final rule is
formulated, but I suggest that there are too many possible
advantages to reject the procedure out of hand.
The purposes and advantages of the other parts of
the proposed procedure are rather obvious. Furnishing
name, address and qualifications in advance of trial makes
it possible to inquire concerning the expert's background.
I know of at least one case in which a gentleman who
testified that he was a graduate of a named engineering
school withdrew when shown a telegram from the univer-
sity stating that he had never attended its engineering
school. That was possible in that case because his testimony
took several days and the defense was being handled by a
nationwide insurance carrier. There is no reason to protect
a charlatan against exposure, and there is no real hardship
in requiring that qualifications be furnished, for most
experts who spend any substantial amount of time in court
have printed or mimeographed qualification sheets avail-
able. Indeed, time may be saved if the parties can agree
simply to" mark the qualification sheets in evidence and
let the jury consider them as an exhibit in the jury room.
Furnishing a copy of an expert's report to the oppo-
nent and permitting the opponent to take the expert's
deposition concerning it does away with surprise, permits
the opponent more adequately to prepare his cross-examina-
tion, probably will result in a better prepared case on
[VoL.42
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both sides and a more clearly formulated issue for the jury
and a shorter trial when the matter finally comes to trial,
and, since it reduces the guesswork involved in evaluating
a case, may very possibly result in settlement of the case.
Since we have, or at least we say we have, long ago
abandoned the game theory of trials, and since the search
for the truth will obviously be advanced by requiring
exchange of reports and allowing examination of the oppos-
ing expert, the law should long ago have advanced to this
stage.
Why, then, has it been so slow to move? In large part
the answer must be resistance to change, rather than logic,
for many of the reasons given border on the disingenuous.
Thus, it is said that the expert is simply communicating
information to the attorney on behalf of the client and,
therefore, the attorney-client privilege applies. While it
is true that the attorney-client privilege protects both the
attorney and the client from having to disclose what was
communicated between them, it is certainly not true that
the client by the simple device of reciting facts to his
attorney can forestall examination of himself before trial
as to those facts, or their recital in a required pleading
such as a bill of particulars. No more should the expert
(in his role as the conduit for communication between the
attorney and the client) be able to immunize himself from
disclosure concerning the facts communicated by him, nor,
since his opinion will become one of the operative facts
at the trial, concerning that opinion.
Again, it is said that the expert is an assistant to the
attorney, and, therefore, his report is within the work
product rule. Of course, that rule is qualified, not abso-
lute, so that if, for example, it can be shown that the
report relates to an item that was consumed or dismantled
in the process of examination by the expert, disclosure of
it would be ordered. In the ordinary case, however, there
is no such necessity. Normally the opposing party has an
equal opportunity to obtain his own expert's report. None-
theless, work product should not frustrate disclosure of an
expert's report and opinion, for the rule essentially is one
1968]
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protecting the efficiency and morale of the legal profession,
and the interests of the client and of justice, by denying
disclosure to opposing counsel of an attorney's theories
and strategy. The rule is not ordinarily carried beyond
theories and strategy to the protection of evidence. Though
it is used to protect statements taken by investigators from
witnesses, the expert's report appears distinguishable from
a witness' statement. In any event, to analogize the two,
while it may protect the report, it cannot protect the expert
from examination any more than would the fact that a
witness had given a statement to one party prevent his
examination before trial by the other.
Whether we speak of the absolute attorney-client privi-
lege or the qualified work-product privilege it is, it seems
to me, the height of unfairness to apply either to proscribe
pre-trial disclosure of expert opinion. To do so is to permit
a party to rely upon privilege to thwart pre-trial examina-
tion and then rely upon the expert's privileged testimony
to prove his case at the trial. The testimony is either
privileged or it is not. If such privilege as exists is going
to be waived for purposes of trial, it must be waived
also for purposes of pre-trial disclosure. I would go no
further in recognition of arguments based on privilege or
work-product than to limit application of the proposed
rule or policy to an expert, or the report of an expert,
who will be called to testify at the trial. It is reasonable,
it seems to me, to exclude the non-testifying advisor because
his function will usually be limited to finding, the holes
in the opponent's case, rather than the furnishing of any
affirmative part of his employer's case. But it is wholly
unreasonable to preclude effective cross-examination of an
expert at the trial by withholding disclosure of his opinion
and the data supporting it until the trial. Effective cross-
examination is precluded, in my opinion, even in those
jurisdictions in which the cross-examiner is entitled, after
completion of the direct testimony, to a copy of the expert's
report for use in cross-examination, for preparation under




But it is said it is unfair to the expert who has a
property right in his opinions to permit them to be taken
without compensation. The short answer is that except
as the questioning on examination before trial goes beyond
the expert's report (in effect, except as the examiner seeks
to make the expert his own witness, about which I shall
have more to say later), the expert has already been paid
by his employer for the time and effort necessary to gather
the foundation facts and formulate the opinion. While
he will not have been paid for the time consumed in the
examination itself, there is no reason why he cannot be.
If he is, I would suggest that initially the cost should be
split between the parties, so that the expert's employer
will not be tempted to arrange with the expert for a fee
so high as to discourage his opponent from seeking ex-
amination, and so that the opponent will not be unduly
prolix in his examination. Ultimately, the entire cost of
the deposition should be deemed a taxable disbursement
to be paid by the losing party.
Some courts on the basis of the supposed unfairness
to the expert permit examination of an expert only as to
facts within his personal knowledge, but not as to his
opinions and conclusions. As already demonstrated, there
need be no unfairness to the expert in eliciting his opinions,
and no other basis for such a limitation withstands analysis.
So far as I am aware, none of the disclosure rules expressly
limit disclosure to facts. While some rules limit disclosure
to evidence, expert opinions are, of course, admissible in
evidence. It is conceivable that by requiring disclosure
at too early a stage, when the expert has not fully developed
the facts or formulated his opinion, his examination could
prove embarrassing to him at the trial, but that objection
relates to the time at which disclosure of opinion should
be allowed, not to whether it should be allowed at all.
Finally, it is said that it is unfair to the litigant
who employs an expert to order disclosure because (1) it
permits his opponent to "manufacture" evidence in rebuttal
and (2) it penalizes the diligent and puts a premium on
laziness. The first contention ignores the fact that without
19681
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disclosure concerning plaintiff's expert's qualifications, his
opinion and the basis for it, defendant will be hard put
to meet the threat of "manufactured" or excessively partisan
expert testimony presented by plaintiff. If, on the other
hand, disclosure is required, plaintiff is not at the same
disadvantage if defendant attempts to "manufacture" expert
rebuttal, for plaintiff will be entitled in advance of trial
to disclosure of defendant's expert's qualifications and
opinions.
The second contention, though requiring more extended
analysis, is no more persuasive. It is conceivable that a
plaintiff may seek to examine a defendant's expert before
trial in order to be able to prove his case without the
expense of hiring his own expert, but as a practical matter
the probability of such a maneuver is not great. In any
event, adequate protection exists in the rule, hereafter dis-
cussed, limiting the right of one party to call as his witness
an expert employed by the other, and additional protection
can be afforded by requiring plaintiff to certify before he
is permitted to see defendant's expert's report or to examine
the expert before trial whether he intends to call an expert
at the trial. It is also conceivable that a defendant may,
after disclosure of plaintiff's expert's report and opinion,
decide that he does not need to bring in an expert because
plaintiff's expert's testimony can be met by cross-examina-
tion. A defendant willing to gamble on the effectiveness
of cross-examination may, it is true, save some expense as
a result of disclosure, but this is true of all disclosure and
can hardly be classified as "unfair."
The basic concept of our system of pleading and prac-
tice is that a party is entitled to know in advance what
he must be prepared to meet. The components of any
claim or defense are law, fact and opinion. To require
disclosure of legal theory in the pleadings and of facts in
bills of particulars, examinations and interrogatories, and
deny disclosure of expert opinion is more unfair than dis-
closure can ever be. Any attempt to harass or embarrass
by the timing or extent of examination of an expert can
be dealt with by protective order, and any statute or rule
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incorporating the suggested policy can establish a two-stage
process, in the first of which each party would present the
name and qualifications of all the experts he intends to
call or a certificate that he intends to call none. Should
he, thereafter, seek permission to call an expert, his prior
certification would be a factor to be weighed by the court
in ruling upon the request.
My conclusion, based on the foregoing analysis, is that
a statute or rule incorporating the suggested policy will
have salutary effects upon trials and is long overdue.
So far we have been considering the right to pre-trial
disclosure as a means of defining the issue and making
effective cross-examination possible. We turn now to the
question of whether a party may call the opposing party or
the opposing party's expert as his own expert witness. I
put to one side cases refusing to permit such testimony
on cross-examination because beyond the scope of the direct
examination, since they do not deal with the merits of the
question.
The point of departure for most courts confronted with
the problem is the cases dealing with the question whether
an expert may be compelled to testify. Almost without
exception those cases agree that an expert cannot be re-
quired, even under subpoena, to render an opinion that
requires study or preparation, for example, by the doing
of an autopsy, but can be required, even without compen-
sation, to testify to matters of fact. The divergence in
the authorities comes in the area of matters of opinion that
do not require additional study or preparation. Those
courts that refuse to compel an expert to testify, or to
testify without compensation, as to such opinions, do so
on the basis of the unfairness to the witness because (1)
he has a property right in his special skills which he may
only be required to give up by agreement, or (2) "only
the most eminent are competent to answer ex tempore
and defend impromptu opinions upon cross-examination,
but none, without reflection upon his professional ability,
may confess ignorance," or (3) an undue burden would be
placed upon those individuals who achieve the greatest
19681
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eminence in a particular science, art or profession. Those
that hold that an expert must testify as to such opinion
take the position that the expert is under the same public
duty as the lay witness; that it is no more unfair to
require an expert to give opinion evidence within his com-
petence (provided he does not have to do special prepara-
tion for it) without compensation other than the usual
witness fee than it is to require a lay witness to testify
concerning facts within his knowledge.
When the expert involved is the opposing party, the
courts are about evenly divided on whether he can be
required to testify concerning matters of opinion. Those '
that hold he cannot do so on the basis of the general rule
that an expert cannot be compelled to give an opinion.
Those that hold that he can differentiate the adverse party
expert from the ordinary expert. It is now the universal
rule that an adverse party may be called as a witness
and examined as freely and fully as any other witness.
The reason for the rule is that all pertinent and relevant
evidence available should be adduced in the interests of
justice. The expert opinion of the adverse party who was
involved in the occurrence in suit is highly relevant and
is readily available, whereas, at least in malpractice actions
(the type of action in which, for the most part, the ques-
tion arises), the testimony of a disinterested expert very
often is not available because most doctors are reluctant to
testify against another doctor. There is no inherent un-
fairness -in allowing a party to prove his case through
the testimony of his adversary; the adversary expert is not
required to do added preparation since the facts are already
within his knowledge; he will not be embarrassed by hav-
ing to defend an impromptu opinion, for he will have had
ample time to study the matter; and there is no possibility
that he will be unduly burdened by being repeatedly called.
For me, the logic and simple justice of that reasoning is
unanswerable. Note, however, that even the enlightened
courts who adhere to it, hold, emphasizing the availability
element, that refusal to permit an adversary expert to be
questioned as his opponent's witness concerning his prO-
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fessional opinion is not prejudicial error when another opin-
ion witness is available to the opponent. I take issue with
that conclusion, however. Though an adversary expert will
not often give opinion evidence favorable to his opponent,
when he does it constitutes not only opinion evidence but
an admission to which the jury may be expected to give
greater weight, and the opponent is, therefore, in a very
real sense prejudiced. To exclude the adversary's admitted-
ly relevant opinion simply because it is cumulative is
to overlook completely that factor.
The problem is more difficult when the expert called
is not the adversary himself but a person hired by the
adversary. If, as sometimes occurs, he has been designated
by both or all parties, there is, of course, no question that
any party may call him as a witness. But assume that
he has been employed by only one party to advise concern-
ing his side of the case and has rendered an opinion
adverse to his employer's interests; may he then be called
as a witness by the opposing party? On the grounds that
to permit him so to be called puts the expert in the un-
ethical position of serving two masters, and will be detri-
mental to proper trial preparation because parties will be
reluctant to engage experts if they can be so used, and in
some instances on the basis of attorney-client privilege or
the work-product rule, the general rule is that he may not
be so called. The cases indicate, however, that here too
availability plays a part. Thus, if it can be shown that
no other expert can be obtained, use of the adversary's
expert as his opponent's witness may be permitted.
Moreover, if we change the facts but slightly and
assume that the expert is employed to examine the opposing
party or the opposing party's property, the result may be
different. Thus, a doctor employed by defendant, not to
advise whether defendant was guilty of malpractice, but to
examine the plaintiff and evaluate his injury has, in several
cases, been held subject to call as plaintiff's witness not-
withstanding any ethical problems involved in his having
been paid by defendant. The rationale is that by submit-
ting to examination plaintiff has furnished the evidence
1968]
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upon which the doctor's opinion is based and disclosure
should not-be a one-way proposition with defendant using
the doctor's. report if favorable to him but suppressing it
if not.
The law with respect to use of the adversary's expert
as a witness is still evolving. Whether the exceptions to
the rule against allowing such use will eventually swallow
up the rule, it is still too early to say. But I suggest that
the considerations involved are economic rather than ethical.
An expert called by the opposing party testifies not under
retainer but under compulsion; the opposing party is not
in any real sense a master that he serves, nor, unless he
testifies to a different opinion than he reported to his
employer, has he done anything unethical. Seldom will
an expert be called by an opposing party who has not seen
his report, so there is little likelihood of any such unethical
conduct. In linal analysis then, the only real embarrass-
ment to the expert arises from the possibility that his
employer may decide not to use him in the future. If that
results, however, it will, unless I am overly cynical, be
because he submitted too many reports favorable to his
employer's opponents, not because in any one of those cases
he repeathd in public and under oath what he had pre-
viously informed his employer in private. I do not mean
to imply 'that the answer to the problem will necessarily
be different if ethical considerations are omitted from the
reasoning process, but simply that it is more logical and
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